Why the biggest country doesn’t just win

The obvious strategy — everyone buys the biggest flag — is priced to disappoint. Four compounding reasons:

1. Marginal power decays twice

The next SOL into a nation buys units at rising cost c(M) and converts to power through a concave exponent. Marginal power-per-SOL is:

π = ∂CP/∂SOL = α · M^(α−1) · (1 + λσ) / (c₀ · (1 + M / M_s))

π is displayed on the globe for every nation, live. When the leader shows 0.3× power per SOL and a minnow shows 2.4×, the market routes itself.

2. Leadership is a bounty

Coalition spoils are split pro-rata among attackers, and the leader’s treasury is, at all times, the largest prize pool on the map. Balance-of-power politics isn’t encouraged — it’s the payoff matrix.

3. Escrow asymmetry cuts both ways

The giant attacking a minnow risks escrow for scraps; minnows attacking the giant in coalition risk little for the biggest sweep in the game.

4. Price is expectation

The leader’s curve already carries the crowd’s SOL; its upside is the thinnest on the map. Every other token is, structurally, a short position on the empire. If everyone buys the leader anyway, the game doesn’t break — it becomes a season-long referendum on whether the world can organize, which is the experiment working.

And whales?

A whale can dominate a single nation’s economy — but that nation becomes the prime target, its reserve a bounty, and winning the season requires war outcomes, not wealth (see winning). Money buys size, not victory. Equal starting treasuries, a two-epoch peace phase, unit build times, and first-48h wallet caps guarantee that no amount of day-one herding fields a day-one army.